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Abstract 
Drawing on in-depth qualitative research exploring EU biofuels policy, I aim to 
advance understandings of the role and influence of policy entrepreneurs within 
Kingdon’s (2011) multiple streams framework (MSF). Focusing on the contribution 
to EU biofuels policy made by one entrepreneurial policy official, I analyse the 
particular discursive techniques this official deployed in seeking to influence EU 
policy-making, and the wider contextual factors that impinged on those techniques’ 
ability to actually attain policy influence. Persuasive framing is shown to have 
enabled the entrepreneur to influence initial agenda setting processes, whilst 
boundary work is shown to have enabled the same official to subsequently defend an 
existing policy in the face of widespread criticism. Critical interactions between all 
three streams of the MSF, however, were outside the control of this policy 
entrepreneur, implying that discursive techniques alone are insufficient to open (or 
close) policy windows. 
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EU biofuels policy: Critical moments and the role of the policy entrepreneur 
Drawing on in-depth qualitative research exploring EU biofuels policy, I aim here to advance 
understandings of the role and influence of the policy entrepreneur within Kingdon’s (2011) 
multiple streams framework (MSF). By examining the contribution to biofuels policy of one 
especially entrepreneurial policy official – to be referred to throughout the article as ‘official 
X’ – I seek more specifically to advance understandings of  the particular discursive 
techniques that a policy entrepreneur might deploy in a bid to influence EU policy-making, 
and the wider contextual factors which impinge on the ability of such techniques to actually 
attain policy influence. 
 Biofuels - essentially “renewable fuels derived from biological feedstocks” (Koh and 
Ghazoul, 2008: 2451) - have proven politically attractive at the EU level because of their 
purported ability to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, enhance the EU’s energy 
security and stimulate rural development. Controversy over the extent to which these benefits 
will accrue from biofuel production in practice, however, has existed at least since the 
passing of the Biofuels Directive in 2003 (EC, 2003). The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED), which superseded the Biofuels Directive by stipulating that 10% of road transport fuel 
should be derived from renewable resources by 2020 (EC, 2009a), did not resolve this 
controversy. Rather, in failing to address the potentially negative consequences of indirect 
land-use change (ILUC), which occurs when biofuel production displaces agricultural 
activity into new geographical territory, it arguably served only to heighten many actors’ 
sustainability concerns. 
 Against this backdrop, the specific empirical case I explore here hinges on the role 
and influence of official X in relation to two separate, critical moments in the development of 
EU biofuels policy between 2003 and 2010. The first of these moments is found in the 
passing of 2003’s Biofuels Directive (EC, 2003), which established indicative targets for 
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biofuel blending in the road transport sector across all EU member states. Whilst this policy 
served as a flagship component of the EU’s wider climate change mitigation efforts in the 
early years of the twenty-first century, for many it nonetheless represents a questionable 
initiative in light of both alternative applications of biomass, and of alternative measures for 
reducing the carbon footprint of the road transport sector (RCEP, 2004; Palmer, 2010). The 
question to be explored in this first part of the empirical case therefore concerns how official 
X contributed to the cultivation of near-unanimous enthusiasm for a transport biofuels 
mandate in 2003. 
 The second critical moment that I address is found in the decision not to take 
legislative action to remediate the consequences of ILUC following the passing of the RED 
in 2009. Given in particular that ILUC might compromise biofuels’ ability to abate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the European Commission was obliged to investigate the 
seriousness of the problem and produce a full impact assessment by the end of 2010, with 
remedial legislation also to be proposed if appropriate. Yet, despite vociferous calls for action 
from a wide range of governmental1 and non-governmental actors (e.g. Birdlife et al., 2009), 
no proposal emerged by this deadline.2 The question to be explored in this second part of the 
empirical case therefore concerns how official X contributed, even in the face of widespread 
pressure to act, to the European Commission’s unwillingness to address ILUC at this time. 
 The remainder of this discussion proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical approach 
and research methods deployed in this study are outlined. Then I provide an assessment of 
the discursive techniques that were deployed by official X in a bid to influence policy at each 
 
1 Many EU member states, including the UK and the Netherlands, called for legislative action in 
responding to a European Commission public consultation in 2010. 




of the two critical moments identified above, before attempting to establish the real extent of 
official X’s influence in each case, by reflecting on the wider contextual factors that might 
also have impacted on the persuasiveness of his discursive arguments. Finally, I reflect on the 
broader implications of my findings for existing theories of the role of the policy 
entrepreneur, and for future research designed to explore the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
EU policy-making. 
Theoretical framework and research design 
The policy entrepreneur in the MSF 
Building on Cohen, March and Olsen’s (1972) ‘garbage can model of organisational choice’, 
Kingdon’s (2011) MSF envisages political decision-making as the product of events 
occurring in three independent ‘process streams’. The first of these, a ‘problems’ stream, 
includes “more or less systematic indicators…dramatic events…or feedback from the 
operation of existing programs” (Kingdon, 2011: 90) that come to the attention of decision-
makers as requiring action of some kind. The second, a ‘policies’ stream, comprises a 
community within which ideas and proposals ‘float around’, “much as molecules floated 
around in what biologists call the primeval soup” (ibid: 116). Thirdly and finally, a ‘politics’ 
stream incorporates “such things as public mood, pressure group campaigns, election 
results…and changes of administration” (ibid: 145). According to this framework, only in 
critical moments when an open ‘policy window’ is present can the three process streams 
couple together, thereby enabling significant policy change to occur. 
 Policy entrepreneurs – actors possessed of scarce rhetorical skills and an exceptional 
dedication to achieve desired ends – represent actors of allegedly high causal significance in 
the MSF. For Kingdon (2011: 205), they are said to “push for one kind of problem definition 
rather than another”, and to “soften up the mass public, specialised publics and the policy 
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community itself” to particular ideas. Perhaps more importantly, they are also argued to help 
couple together the three process streams of the MSF by having “their pet proposals or their 
concerns about problems ready, and push[ing] them at the propitious moments” (ibid: 205). 
Under these auspices, the concept of the policy entrepreneur has contributed to perceptive 
analyses of EU policy processes across a diverse range of issue-areas, including common 
agricultural policy reform (Ackrill and Kay, 2011), common foreign and security policy 
(Krause, 2003), and the higher education agenda (Corbett, 2005). 
Theorising entrepreneurial influence: The analytical potential of ‘framing’ and ‘boundary 
work’ 
 Important theoretical questions remain to be addressed however, in relation to both 
the precise nature of the discursive strategies that policy entrepreneurs actually use to couple 
process streams together, and with respect to the wider contextual factors that impinge on 
such strategies’ ability to actually attain policy influence in specific cases. With regard to 
strategies for instance, fertile ground exists for building upon Kingdon’s (2011) notions of 
‘investing considerable resources’, ‘developing information’ about problems, and ‘softening 
up’ the political system. In relation to influence meanwhile, ambiguity persists over the 
nature of entrepreneurs’ interactions with other variables in the policy process, as well as 
over the type and scale of policy changes that entrepreneurs can bring about in different 
circumstances. Following Ackrill et al. (2013), we might also ask whether policy 
entrepreneurs could both facilitate and preclude policy change, either by coupling process 
streams together, or by preventing them from coupling, at otherwise propitious moments. 
 In order to address these questions, I seek to build upon Kingdon’s (2011) ideas by 
applying the theoretical concepts of ‘framing’ from interpretive policy analysis (see Rein and 
Schön, 1991) and ‘boundary work’ from science and technology studies (see Gieryn, 1983; 
Jasanoff, 1987) to the MSF. Framing, understood as a “way of selecting, organizing, 
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interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing, 
analysing, persuading and acting” (Rein and Schön 1991: 263), serves to bring clarity and 
focus to political debates by virtue of the boundaries that it implicitly draws around complex, 
multi-faceted issues. In short, this strategy serves to render ‘knowable’ not just problems, but 
also potential solutions to those problems, making the contingent and the contestable seem 
common sense and natural. Boundary work, by contrast, is understood to involve the 
rhetorical “attribution of selected characteristics to the institution of science… for purposes 
of constructing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities as ‘non-
science’” (Gieryn, 1983: 782). Consequently, its significance resides not in its potential to 
dictate the nature of problems or solutions, but rather in its ability to distinguish between 
more or less authoritative sources of evidence and expertise upon which to base policy 
decisions, especially where the problems and solutions in question are complex or 
controversial. 
 Rhetoric, persuasion and argument have of course long been recognised as important 
variables in policy-making processes of all kinds (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Majone, 1989; 
Pellizzoni, 2001). Framing and boundary work serve, however, as two especially well-
defined examples of discursive techniques that strategic and committed political actors – and 
most obviously policy entrepreneurs – could deploy in a bid to help drive policy 
developments along particular vectors. In this respect they offer a potentially valuable means 
of enhancing our understanding of the processes that can lead policy windows to open, or see 
them remain closed. With this in mind, the purpose of the discussion that follows is to 
explore the analytical utility of both concepts in relation to the specific actions and policy 
influence of official X in the realm of EU biofuels policy, focusing on each of the two critical 
moments identified above in turn. Before undertaking this task, however, a brief word now 
follows on the study’s materials and methods. 
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Research materials and methods 
 The data I present in the discussion that follows has been derived from 33 semi-
structured interviews, conducted with a range of actors involved in debates about EU biofuels 
policy and indirect land-use change, as well as in-depth analysis of key policy proposals, 
scientific reports, public consultation responses and other relevant documentation and grey 
literature. Interviews, which all lasted between 40 and 90 minutes, were conducted with 
policy-makers at the EU and member state levels (9), one Member of European Parliament, 
expert scientists and consultants (12), representatives of both the biofuel and fossil fuel 
industries (6), and campaigners working for environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) (5). For ethical reasons, the anonymity of all interviewees has been preserved in the 
text that follows.3 
Making the case for biofuels: Policy entrepreneurship as persuasive framing? 
In formal terms at least, plans to expand the use of biofuels in Europe’s road transport sector 
were first articulated by the European Commission in a 2001 White Paper on transport (EC, 
2001). Citing what it called the “inadequacy of…measures taken to date both to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles and to reduce the European Union’s energy 
dependency” (ibid: 82), the Commission vowed in this document to encourage the use of 
biofuels through a combination of indicative targets and tax reduction schemes. Furthermore, 
it also went on to purport that “the production of raw materials for biofuels may be of 
particular interest under the Common Agricultural Policy for creating new economic 
resources and preserving employment in the agricultural community” (EC, 2001: 87). 
Biofuels therefore gained credibility in Europe at this time not only because of their 
purported ability to mitigate climate change and enhance energy security, but also because 
 
3 In the case of European Commission officials, adhering to this principle importantly necessitates 
withholding details of each interviewee’s Directorate General (DG). 
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they were deemed likely to generate income for the bloc’s agricultural sector. Such a ‘tripod-
style’ approach to promoting biofuels did not emerge automatically, however. Rather, from 
the perspective of Kingdon’s (2011) multiple streams framework (MSF), the tripod can be 
said to have resulted from the active coupling of biofuels – one idea circulating in the EU’s 
policy ‘primeval soup’ at the outset of the twenty-first century – with specific issues 
circulating in the EU’s ‘problems stream’ at this time. 
 The coupling of biofuels and climate change might of course seem entirely 
reasonable, particularly given the urgency with which solutions to the transport sector’s 
climate change impacts were already being sought in Europe. The Commission’s 2001 White 
Paper on transport, for instance, had forecast that total EU transport emissions would grow by 
approximately 50% between 1990 and 2010 if no action was taken to reduce them (from 
c.739 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent to c.1.11 billion tonnes) (EC, 2001). Road transport 
was singled out as a crucial area to address, not least because it accounted for 84% of overall 
transport emissions (ibid: 10). Moreover, transport compared unfavourably with all other 
sectors in Europe in respect of its forecast GHG emissions up to 2020 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Forecast change in EU25 CO2 emissions by sector, measured in millions of 
tonnes per year, 2005-2020 (Source: EC, 2007: 3). 
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 Arguments deployed by those making the case specifically for biofuels as a solution 
to climate change prior to 2003, however – including official X - were notable for their 
tendency to subscribe to a quite specific interpretation of road transport’s ‘climate change 
question’, on two levels. Firstly, they depicted biofuels as the only readily available means of 
reducing road transport GHG emissions. This was not necessarily a novel contestation; 
indeed it had already been articulated in the Commission’s 2001 White Paper, which declared 
that “the most promising forms [of renewable energy in transport] are biofuels in the short 
and medium term, natural gas in the medium and long term and hydrogen in the very long 
term” (EC, 2001: 86).4 Continuing to highlight the immediate GHG mitigation capabilities of 
biofuels in this way nonetheless served as a powerful argument before the passing of the 
Biofuels Directive, particularly when viewed alongside the imminent projected growth in 
transport emissions shown in Figure 1.  
 At a more fundamental level, actors coupling biofuels to climate change – again 
including official X – were also notably depicting road transport GHG emissions as 
extremely difficult to reduce without biofuel blending. The nature of this second type of 
argument was neatly summarised, for instance, in the words of a campaigner working for a 
prominent, Brussels-based environmental NGO: 
“If you want to reduce emissions in the transport sector you have to make people pay even 
more for their fuel and make them pay more for bigger cars and make them pay for the roads 
they are using...but all of those are horribly unpopular. So this was like “oh great! Give them a 
green fuel, they can all go on driving as before…and they’ll also save the planet”.” (Interview, 
NGO Campaigner, 2010) 
 
4 Several years after the Biofuels Directive had been passed, the Commission continued to rely on this 
type of argument, stating in a 2007 progress report, for instance, that biofuels represented “the only 
direct substitute for oil in [the transport sector]...available on a significant scale” (EC, 2007: 2). 
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 Notwithstanding the obvious political appeal of this argument, realistic alternative 
measures for reducing road transport GHG emissions did in fact exist in Europe at the outset 
of the twenty-first century. Indeed, in some cases – witness for instance the Commission’s 
pioneering fuel efficiency regulation (EC, 2009b) – such alternatives have even been 
successfully implemented (although not without controversy). Moreover, and at a broader 
level, the argument that the most appropriate use of Europe’s biomass resources was in the 
transport sector, rather than in heat or electricity generation, was also far from uncontested at 
this time (Clift and Mulugetta, 2007; DTI, DFT and DEFRA, 2007; RCEP, 2004). 
 Despite these caveats, in the years preceding the passing of the Biofuels Directive, 
official X was deemed by many interviewees to have played a pivotal role in reinforcing a 
narrow view of these issues, one within which biofuels constituted the only feasible means of 
mitigating road transport GHG emissions. As one of official X’s colleagues in the 
Commission explained in an interview: 
“The argument that was always used in transport was “oh, it’s too difficult.” And then 
[official X] comes along: “Oh no but biofuels can help...this is the easy way to reduce GHG 
emissions”.” (Interview, Commission Official, 2011) 
In view of the alternatives that did in fact exist, the same official went on to state that: 
“It was completely turning the argument on its head and [he] got away with it...because [he] 
managed to convince people that it was all terribly difficult and that you couldn’t do anything 
else.” (Interview, Commission Official, 2011) 
 At a broader level moreover, official X’s arguments were also seen by many 
interviewees as crucial in drawing together each of the three aspects of the aforementioned 
‘tripod’ to form a more resilient and defensible overall picture of biofuels, as a technology 
capable of tackling multiple problems simultaneously. As one Commission official 
explained, the rhetorical power of this argument was formidable: 
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“[Official X] had a strategy at the beginning, which was – you know – biofuels policy was 
based on climate, on energy security and on rural development – three legs. And the thing was 
that whenever you said “oh, but this biofuel doesn’t do x”, he would say “oh, but it does y and 
z”.” (Interview, Commission Official, 2011) 
 Such discursive argumentation arguably represents a classic instance of what Rein 
and Schön (1991) would term framing, whereby official X selectively interpreted and drew 
boundaries around the otherwise complex reality of prevailing problems and potential 
solutions circulating in debates about EU road transport emissions. By framing road transport 
sector GHG emissions as both more urgent and more difficult to reduce than other types of 
emissions, and biofuels as a technology capable of reducing emissions immediately (whilst 
solving additional problems at the same time), official X helped to couple what Kingdon 
(2011) would term the ‘problems’ and ‘policies’ streams in Europe at this time. Whilst he 
was certainly not the only actor who subscribed to them, official X’s articulation of these 
framings was deemed by many interviewees to have had a disproportionate impact on the 
ultimate emergence of the Biofuels Directive. As one Commission official put it: 
“[F]rankly if we could stop [biofuels] dead tomorrow that would be the right thing to do…we 
should never have got into this mess in the first place; it’s because [official X] was too 
eloquent that we did.” (Interview, Commission Official, 2011) 
 To grasp the full implications of this first case for existing theoretical understandings 
of policy entrepreneurs, it will of course be necessary to reflect more broadly on the wider 
contextual factors – beyond official X’s persuasive framing alone – that might also have 
facilitated the opening of a policy window enabling the Biofuels Directive’s emergence. I will 
address these questions later. Now, however, I move on to assess the role of official X in a 
second critical moment in EU biofuels policy – one found in the European Commission’s 
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decision not to take regulatory action designed to mitigate the effects of indirect land-use 
change. 
Defending the status quo: Policy entrepreneurship as boundary work? 
In the years following the passing of the Biofuels Directive, biofuels’ image deteriorated 
significantly as a range of actors began to call their sustainability credentials into question 
(Dunlop, 2010; Palmer, 2010).5 Indirect land-use change (ILUC) undoubtedly forms the most 
complex and controversial issue to have emerged in this period. Briefly, it occurs when 
biofuel feedstocks are cultivated on pre-existing agricultural land, thereby displacing 
agricultural production (for instance for food or animal feed) into new geographical territory. 
Despite the fact that ILUC engenders a potentially wide range of impacts, scientific 
assessments of its scale have focused almost exclusively on the GHG emissions that it might 
generate (Fargione et al., 2008; Melillo et al., 2009; Searchinger et al., 2008).6 In a similar 
fashion, assessments of ILUC conducted in Brussels since the passing of the Renewable 
Energy Directive (which obliged the Commission to report on the issue by the end of 2010), 
have also been premised on a framing of this problem as exclusively comprising a carbon 
accounting error (Palmer, 2012, 2014; Levidow, 2013).7 
 
5 Influential contributors to this change of image in the UK were reports published by the House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC, 2008) and the Royal Society (2008). 
6 Searchinger et al. (2008) claimed that ILUC could cause biofuels to generate up to twice as many 
GHG emissions over 30 years as their fossil fuel counterparts. 
7 The European Commission was aware of ILUC prior to the passing of the Renewable Energy 
Directive, but did not include formal measures to counter its effects in that legislation. Whilst this 
represents an intriguing instance of ‘non-decision-making’, it unfortunately falls outside the remit of 
data available here, which focuses on debates taking place after the RED’s passing. 
 
 14 
 Since ILUC propagates through global agricultural markets, it is impossible to 
observe any ‘cause-and-effect’ chain proving that biofuel production in one location has 
irrefutably brought about land-use change in another. As a result, the vast majority of 
scientific evidence made available to policy-makers charged with addressing the problem has 
been derived from equilibrium modelling. The European Commission itself funded three 
official modelling studies of this nature in the immediate aftermath of the passing of the 
RED, which sought: to quantify the global trade and environmental impacts of the EU’s 
biofuels mandate (Al-Riffai et al., 2010); to compare the marginal ILUC emissions 
associated with different biofuels as estimated by a range of different models (Edwards et al., 
2010); and to compare the estimated impacts of EU biofuels targets on agricultural markets 
and land-use across three widely used agro-economic models (Blanco-Fonseca et al., 2010). 
Since each of these reports subscribed to different assumptions about the nature of 
relationships linking land-use change patterns to wider shifts in the demand for, and prices 
and yields of, crops, their projections of the scale of ILUC that would be brought about by 
EU biofuels targets differed markedly. Edwards et al. (2010) present estimates of the total 
area of land-use change that would result from the Renewable Energy Directive’s 
implementation, as forecast by a range of modelling studies. For bioethanol, they find that 
estimates vary between 107,000 and 863,000 hectares for every million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe) produced, whilst for biodiesel they find estimates which range from 
242,000 to 1.9 million hectares per Mtoe. In light of these vastly divergent projections, 
debates about the true significance of ILUC in Brussels came - from 2010 onwards - to play 
out through protagonists’ attempts to establish the relative credibility of the wide range of 
knowledge claims emanating from equilibrium-modelling studies. 
 Intriguingly, as was the case in debates about biofuels taking place prior to the 
passing of the Biofuels Directive in 2003, many interviewees again identified the discursive 
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strategies deployed by official X as having proved particularly influential in the face of this 
uncertainty. At one level, official X – like many other actors in the ILUC debate – pinpointed 
poor quality data inputs and erroneous assumptions as a major limitation of much equilibrium 
modelling work. In itself this is not remarkable; all equilibrium modelling relies on a large 
number of assumptions, both because certain basic parameters are not perfectly known (for 
instance the total area of arable land that is available globally), and because relationships 
among interdependent variables are not fully understood (for instance between commodity 
prices and average yields). Importantly, however, one might not only question the reliability 
of the data and assumptions being used to represent parameters and relationships in an 
equilibrium model; at a more fundamental level it is also possible to argue that such 
relationships are not of a linear or otherwise predictable nature, and thus not amenable to 
modelling in the first place. Under these conditions, one would not be able to distinguish 
objectively between ‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’ data or assumptions. 
 With these points in mind, it is notable that official X’s views, as expressed in an 
interview provided for this research, appear to have subscribed to the assumption that better 
data inputs would lead to improvements in the accuracy of equilibrium models’ projections: 
“Are these [modelling] tools up to it? No… but a big problem is data. The estimates I’ve seen 
for the global area of cropland in 2000 vary from 1.2 to 2 billion hectares, and that’s just one 
of the basic pieces of data.” (Interview, Official X, 2010) 
 According to many interviewees, moreover, by pointing to divergences in the quality 
of data underpinning all existing ILUC studies – whether undertaken by the European 
Commission or independently – official X was also able to depict the broader field of ILUC 
modelling as exhibiting a trend towards providing lower projections of the seriousness of 
ILUC as knowledge ‘developed’ over time. Indeed, Official X himself remarked of ILUC 
modelling work being undertaken in American research institutes in precisely this manner: 
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“I think it’s interesting that the American numbers are going down, so the [Argonne National 
Laboratory8] work for example is now down, in a calculation method which is equivalent to 
ours and with assumptions equivalent to ours.” (Interview, Official X, 2010) 
Similarly, a Member of the European Parliament who had chaired a public debate on ILUC in 
2010 described how official X had deployed a similar form of argument in that setting: 
“[Official X] was deliberately - in presentations - using studies with years attached, and giving 
the feeling, “the more we know, the lower the value is”. And he knows that’s not true. 
Because it depends on…the process, it depends on the region. And he deliberately chose the 
right products and regions to give the idea that it was declining…” (Interview, Member of 
European Parliament, 2011) 
 Where equilibrium modelling work offered outputs contradictory to this declining 
trend, official X – again, like many other actors – was able to critique it on the basis that its 
calculations were underpinned by poorer quality data and assumptions. Of one piece of ILUC 
modelling work that had been sponsored by a consortium of environmental NGOs (Croezen 
et al., 2010), for instance, official X remarked: 
“I was very disappointed in [that] report that came out recently, which is obviously [three non-
governmental organisations] trying to engage with the science. I don’t think it’s… really all 
that scientific or all that objective. I’ve asked for the data that lie behind the calculations.” 
(Interview, Official X, 2010) 
 In order to make these types of claims in an authoritative manner, official X needed to 
demonstrate many of the characteristics associated with Kingdon’s (2011) original definition 
of the policy entrepreneur – particularly by ‘investing considerable resources’ in developing 
his own understanding of the equilibrium modelling process, and in keeping abreast of fast-
moving developments in the relevant scientific literature. The words of one expert scientist – 
 
8 Tyner et al. (2010). 
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an individual with first-hand experience of discussing ILUC with official X in Brussels – 
attest to this extreme level of dedication: 
“He’s not a scientist, but he reads every source of information he can, and he picks out little 
quotes... you know sound bites from each one, to come out with at the right moment.” 
(Interview, Expert Scientist, 2010) 
The discursive strategy deployed in this case by official X arguably goes beyond Kingdon’s 
(2011) description of policy entrepreneurs as actors who ‘develop information’ about 
problems, ‘soften up the policy community’ and ‘push pet proposals at propitious moments’. 
Instead, it comprises a nuanced form of boundary work (Gieryn, 1983) in which ‘scientific’ 
status is – strategically in the eyes of many interviewees – applied to certain examples of 
equilibrium modelling and not others, under the auspices of judgements of the ‘quality’ of 
those studies’ respective data and assumptions. Such boundary work does not, of course, 
explain how the ‘quality’ of data is itself to be determined, nor legislate for the possibility 
that even ostensibly accurate data might only prove accurate in representing complex, non-
linear relationships at a given point in space and time. Perhaps most importantly, neither does 
it imply that official X’s arguments are any less credible than those of other actors in the 
ILUC debate with a countervailing point of view.9 Even so, given the Commission’s failure 
to propose legislation designed to tackle ILUC in late 2010, official X’s boundary work does 
appear in this case to have proven influential. This second part of the empirical case therefore 
suggests that policy entrepreneurs might successfully influence policy developments – in this 
case precluding a policy window from opening – by imposing their interpretations of the 
boundary between scientific and unscientific knowledge upon otherwise complex and 
 
9 Indeed, the point of this analysis is not to establish who was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ about ILUC; 
uncertainties over the very nature of the relationships linking global trade and land-use change 
patterns preclude the definitive identification of ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ points of view. The aim here is 
simply to examine the discursive techniques through which one dominant perspective on the 
significance of ILUC was established. 
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uncertain policy debates (and thus by determining the type and scope of evidence upon which 
policy decisions – or ‘non-decisions’ – are ultimately based). 
Establishing influence: Policy entrepreneurship in wider context 
In the previous sections I have outlined two distinct discursive strategies that were deployed 
by an influential policy entrepreneur at critical moments in debates over EU biofuels policy. 
In each case however, questions remain over the actual extent of the influence that this 
entrepreneur’s discursive activity exerted over EU policy-making, as indeed they do over our 
capacity to verify that influence in the context of a range of other factors. Indeed, following 
Kingdon (2002: 97), we must ultimately acknowledge that whilst public policymaking “does 
have a sort of structure”, there is also “plenty of room for complexity, uncertainty, fluidity, 
and residual randomness”. Whilst generalizable conclusions are therefore difficult to draw, 
the two vignettes presented here nonetheless suggest that the concepts of framing and 
boundary work can productively enhance the analytical purchase of Kingdon’s (2011) ideas 
relating to the role and influence of the policy entrepreneur. 
 As outlined above, official X’s careful framing of road transport GHG emissions as 
particularly difficult to reduce, and of biofuels as a means of immediately reducing such 
emissions (whilst solving additional problems at the same time), was identified by many 
interviewees as crucial in contributing to the passing of the Biofuels Directive. Here we might 
therefore conclude that persuasive framing by a policy entrepreneur was critical in coupling 
Kingdon’s ‘policies’ and ‘problems’ streams, and ultimately opening a policy window. Yet 
from another perspective the influence of such careful framing of problems and policies 
might reasonably be expected to command a disproportionate influence over political agenda-
setting, precisely because this is the only ‘phase’ of the policy process that does not prescribe 
a formal role for scientific evidence (Keller, 2009). Such a conclusion would sit comfortably, 
for instance, with Stone’s (1989: 282) view of agenda setting as a process in which “political 
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actors use narrative story lines and symbolic devices to manipulate so-called issue 
characteristics, all the while making it seem as though they are simply describing facts”.  
 If persuasive framing is routine during the agenda setting ‘phase’ of the policy 
process, the emergence of the Biofuels Directive can only be fully explained by pinpointing 
wider events or conditions that were predisposed towards that framing, thus enabling a policy 
window to actually open. The most likely variable to fulfil such a remit in this case is, 
arguably, to be found in what Kingdon (2011) would term the ‘politics’ stream, in the form of 
contemporaneous debates about reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Specifically, in the context of the imminent accession of ten new member states to the EU in 
2004, proposals for CAP reform had raised concerns about policy-makers’ ability to continue 
to ensure an adequate income for farmers in many parts of Europe. Since a biofuels mandate 
promised to provide an alternative source of income to European farmers, it spoke directly to 
these concerns. Whilst persuasive framing by a policy entrepreneur was therefore crucial in 
successfully coupling ‘problems’ and ‘policies’ to give shape to an emergent policy window 
in the run up to 2003, it was arguably only in the context of propitious conditions provided by 
contemporary developments in the EU’s ‘politics’ stream that such a window could actually 
be prised open. Put differently, whilst framing might well serve as a “powerful [way] of 
changing the prevailing perspective on an issue” (Princen, 2013: 865), in and of itself this 
strategy may not have sufficient capacity to provoke substantial policy change in the form of 
an entirely new piece of legislation like the Biofuels Directive. 
 Meanwhile, the use of a nuanced form of boundary work by official X in debates over 
indirect land-use change (ILUC) was identified by many interviewees as a significant factor 
in the European Commission’s ultimate failure to propose remedial legislation addressing this 
matter in late 2010. Far from provoking substantial policy change, this critical moment 
therefore effectively witnessed policy inertia, as the biofuels policy ‘status quo’ was 
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successfully defended. More significantly perhaps, and also in contrast to the events outlined 
above, this second critical moment involved the influence of a policy entrepreneur not over 
agenda-setting, but rather over a debate concerned with the evaluation of an existing policy’s 
effectiveness and impacts. If, as Keller (2009) claims, this later, more evaluative ‘phase’ of 
the policy process affords a clearer and more formal role to the application of scientific 
evidence than is common in agenda-setting, discursive strategies such as boundary work - 
oriented as it is towards the interpretation of formal scientific evidence - might also be 
regarded as routine. 
 Consequently, it is again necessary to look elsewhere for factors that might permit a 
full explanation of the lack of policy change that characterised this second critical moment in 
EU biofuels policy. Several factors emanating from the ‘politics’ stream can be singled out as 
worthy of attention in this respect. One comprises the novel presence – at least by 
comparison with 2003 – of a well developed and increasingly powerful biofuels industry, one 
whose very existence owed much to the earlier passing of the Biofuels Directive. The 
significance of this development is well articulated by one European Environment Agency 
official: 
“They’ve built up an industry, which they are kind of reluctant to... drop, … and obviously 
there’s now really big players involved like BP, Shell and so on. They all have interests now, 
they’re really lobbying very heavily.” (Interview, European Environment Agency Official,
 
2010) 
 Another factor can be found in the status of ILUC as a phenomenon whose 
occurrence – despite being associated with potentially deleterious effects – is ultimately 
inconsequential to the material substance of biofuels as an end product. As Ponte and 
Daugbjerg (2015) make clear, World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules permit the restriction 
of international trade only in cases where variable production processes lead to materially 
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detectable variations in the same commodity. Since biofuels’ ILUC impacts are 
indistinguishable at the point of use, any penalty or disincentive applied to biofuels 
associated with ILUC could theoretically be interpreted by producer countries as an illegal 
barrier to trade. In short, concerns about a possible WTO complaint may in themselves have 
led the Commission to decide against proposing regulation addressing ILUC in late 2010. 
 A final relevant factor, meanwhile, can be found in the nature of official X’s 
institutional position, situated at the heart of the biofuels policy community in Brussels. In 
the first instance, a central position afforded official X more frequent opportunities to 
participate in political discussions (both formal and informal, public and private) relating to 
ILUC than actors outside of the policymaking community, whose views of the issue may 
have been different. Equally important, however, was official X’s unusually long period of 
service in the same post within the Commission (constituting a lack of ‘administrative 
turnover’ in Kingdon’s (2011) parlance). Such long service may have led official X’s views 
on biofuels to become especially entrenched; it would also have ensured that he outlasted 
many more senior political figures within the Commission who engaged with biofuels policy 
in the years leading up to the emergence of ILUC as a political controversy. Given that many 
of these figures are - in the words of one interviewee - “at the mercy of the information 
they’re given by their officials”10, official X’s long service could have caused his framings 
and interpretations of ILUC to be well represented not just in debates taking place between 
the Commission and other actors, but at higher levels within the Commission too. 
 When combined with the presence of a powerful biofuels industry and concerns over 
WTO compliance, official X’s longstanding occupation of the same role within the 
Commission would likely have made it difficult for a wider range of actors disposed of 
 
10 Interview, Commission Official, 2010 
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alternative views of ILUC to exert an influence over debates about this problem between 
2009 and 2010. In short, official X’s boundary work in this case may well have been essential 
in precluding policy change from occurring, but in and of itself it was not sufficient to 
prevent a policy window from opening that could nonetheless have permitted such change to 
occur – for instance in the form of legislation designed to mitigate ILUC’s effects. Rather, it 
was the combination of such boundary work with events and conditions prevailing in the 
politics stream that ultimately led to the observed lack of policy change in this second part of 
the case. 
Conclusions: The analytical contributions of framing and boundary work 
Drawing on Kingdon’s (2011) ‘multiple streams framework’ (MSF), I have here presented an 
analysis of two critical moments in the history of EU biofuels policy. By applying the 
concepts of ‘framing’ and ‘boundary work’, I have sought to advance theoretical 
understandings of the role and influence of the policy entrepreneur – an actor of special 
causal significance in the MSF. I have documented how process stream coupling was 
achieved through one influential Commission official’s use of persuasive framing (Rein and 
Schön, 1991), pertaining both to biofuels and to the problems that they were supposed to be 
solving. Following Heclo (1974: 307), this entrepreneur’s actions can be said to have 
exemplified the view that “sometimes, a choice has been made prior to canvassing 
alternatives and this has been sent out, not only to do battle with other alternatives, but to find 
a problem.” Even whilst this official’s persuasive framing was pivotal in giving shape to an 
emergent policy proposal however, an actual policy window could only be opened because 
this proposal sat comfortably with additional, favourable developments in the EU’s ‘politics’ 
stream – developments residing well outside the remit of any single entrepreneur’s control. 
Furthermore, I documented how a single policy entrepreneur was able to prevent rather than 
promote policy change in the face of concerns over indirect land-use change, specifically 
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through the use of a nuanced form of boundary work (Gieryn, 1983). However, official X’s 
boundary work met with apparent success in this case only because of his prominent 
institutional position, his relative permanence within the policy community, and the novel 
presence of an increasingly powerful biofuels industry in the EU’s politics stream. 
 Overall, these findings suggest that theoretical tools from interpretive literatures, such 
as framing and boundary work, can enhance the analytical purchase of Kingdon’s (2011) 
concept of the policy entrepreneur. In this respect, the analysis does not simply describe 
specific discursive strategies that might potentially be deployed by a policy entrepreneur 
(framing and boundary work); it also suggests that these strategies may be conducive to the 
cultivation of policy influence only in particular directions, and even then only at particular 
types of moments during the policy process. More specifically, persuasive framing might 
prove influential as a means of opening a policy window during agenda-setting, when 
scientific evidence plays at most a partial and informal role in making decisions. Boundary 
work, meanwhile, may be more effective at preventing a policy window from opening during 
implementation and evaluation, where debates about the consequences and efficacy of an 
existing policy are almost always based upon scientific evidence. In addition to these points 
moreover, the analysis also suggests that discursive strategies such as framing and boundary 
work are useful to entrepreneurs principally as a means of controlling the interactions of only 
two out of the three streams of Kingdon’s (2011) MSF – ‘problems’ and ‘policies’. In both 
cases outlined here, events and conditions prevailing in the politics stream - whilst essential 
in enabling observed policy outcomes to take place - were not amenable to the control of a 
single policy actor such as official X. In the absence of serendipitous combinations with 
critical elements of this politics stream therefore, any policy entrepreneur’s efforts to open (or 
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